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This article analyses the effect that the rise of populist parties in the aftermath of the European 
Great Recession has had on the substantive representation of poor citizens. Scholarly research 
assumes populism enhances democratic inclusion by giving voice to groups that are not 
represented by political elites and by obliging them to react and change their political agenda 
to include these marginalised preferences (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013; Kaltwasser, 2012; 
Roberts, 2016). While studies on the effects of populism on political representation have 
focused on this dynamic more indirectly looking at the emergence of new conflict dimensions 
or the congruence between parties and voters on the main dimensions (Huber & Ruth, 2017), 
the representation of politically marginalised groups has been left underexplored. According to 
Bornschier (2017) one of the main difficulties is finding a yardstick to assess whether the 
representation before the presence of populist challenger parties was good or bad, and for which 
segments within the electorate. 
Despite these evident difficulties, however, a look at the literature on political 
representation shows that liberal democracy always works in favour of better-off citizens. 
Scholarly research (Bartels, 2008; Elsässer, Hense, & Schäfer, 2017; Rigby & Wright, 2013) 
repeatedly demonstrates that poor citizens have limited voice in the democratic arena and that 
the electoral and decision-making spheres are systematically less responsive to their 
preferences. Besides mainstream party convergence around market liberalism, the main reason 
for this is unequal political participation (Schäfer, 2018; Solt, 2008). Poor citizens are less likely 
to vote and their preferences therefore less likely to enter the political process. Political parties 
in first instance have few incentives to represent their demands. Leaving the most disadvantaged 
out of the system breaks with the principle of representation that should characterise the 
elections of representative democracy. While this dynamic is inherent to most Western 
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democracies, it may well explain why the economic crisis hit the poor hardest by worsening 
their poverty. 
Populist parties, which massively grew in the aftermath of the Great Recession and 
especially in many severely crisis-affected economies of Southern Europe, campaign against 
the elites and claim to represent the true voice of ‘the people’ (Laclau, 2005). As the deck of 
democracy is always stacked in favour of the better-off and the political process largely 
unresponsive to everyone else, in their anti-elite campaign populist parties indeed point to a 
real democratic deficit (Schäfer, 2018). However, do populist parties contribute to correct this 
deficit by being more responsive to the poor in their political agendas than other parties? Have 
establishment parties become more attentive towards the most disadvantaged in response to the 
growth of populist challengers? These are the questions that this article aims to answer. 
To do so, this study focuses on political parties’ issue attention towards poor citizens during 
the Great Recession in Spain, a country that has been strongly affected by the crisis and figures 
among those countries in Europe showing the highest levels of poverty. The main political 
consequence of the crisis in Spain has been the rise of new parties – Podemos and Ciudadanos 
– who to a greater or lesser extent match with current definitions of populism and whose 
discourse structures around the democratic regeneration of the political establishment 
(Scantamburlo, Alonso, & Gómez, 2018). While most studies on the political effects of the 
crisis focus on the national level, I scale my analysis down to the level of individual 
Autonomous Communities (ACs). Since new challengers first emerged at the regional level and 
the administration of public services deemed most important for tackling poverty, such as health 
and social services, is a regional field of competence, Spanish ACs represent a good case to 
explore these parties’ impact on the representation of the poor. Given its unique character, the 
Spanish case is helpful for a first exploration of the expected dynamics, opening up new avenues 
for further testing. 
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In line with the above-mentioned studies, the main argument is that populist parties appeal 
to voter groups that have been excluded from the representation process (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 
2013; Roberts, 2016). More concretely, as establishment parties tend to ignore low-income 
citizens particularly in contexts of hardship (Anderson & Beramendi, 2012) populist parties 
present themselves as a more authentic representative of their preferences. Using data from 
party manifestos by combining the content analysis of the Regional Manifestos Project (Alonso, 
Gómez, & Cabeza, 2013) with issue sub-categorisation (Horn, Kevins, Jensen, & Van 
Kersbergen, 2017) the article shows that the rise of populist challenger parties in Spain led to 
increased poverty responsiveness in regional political spaces of competition through supply-
side adaption concerning proposals tackling poverty and social exclusion.  
The article is structured as follows. I first introduce the theoretical background regarding 
populism, its relationship with representative democracy and the representation of 
socioeconomically marginalised groups. After the introduction to the case, the fourth section 
presents the theoretical expectations that will guide the comparative analysis. Section five 
introduces the main data and operationalisation. The empirical findings are presented in section 
six. The seventh section concludes with a discussion of the results. 
Populism, Representation and Political Exclusion 
The term populism is highly contested and different labels have been used to define it. Most 
scholars agree on Mudde’s (2004, p. 543) ideational approach that defines populism as ‘thin’ 
ideology considering society ‘to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic 
groups – ‘the pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be 
an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’. Although populist parties 
vary from the left to the right, the core conception of populism as ‘thin’ ideology implies a 
rather specific perspective on democracy (Kriesi, 2014). At the heart of this perspective lies the 
ideal of democratic representation, which is associated with a maximum claim of 
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responsiveness (Caramani, 2017). Populist parties identify the general interest in the will of the 
people and the representatives have to reflect it by acting ‘on behalf’ of this interest. 
Accordingly, their discourse revolves around a permanent crisis of representation, which is the 
result of unresponsive elites who escaped popular control (Ruth & Hawkins, 2017).  
This unmediated concept of political representation stands in a tense relationship with 
liberal definitions of democracy. Building on Dahl’s (1971) classic two-dimensional 
conceptualisation of polyarchy, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013) refer to this relationship as 
double-edged, whereby populism can be a threat but also a corrective for (liberal) democracy. 
While the threat component refers to undermining democratic contestation by weakening the 
rule of law, checks and balances or the protection of minorities, the corrective potential assumes 
populism to enhance the democratic inclusion of politically and socioeconomically 
marginalised citizens. The latter point paved the way to reflections about populism as a mode 
of political representation and the rise of populist parties as an answer to failed or ineffectual 
political representation, thereby questioning the degree to which liberal institutions are able to 
achieve the goal of connecting popular inputs with political outputs (Mair, 2013; Roberts, 2016; 
Ruth & Hawkins, 2017). Conceptualising it as a top-down and anti-establishment way of 
mobilising constituencies lacking capacity for autonomous political expression, Roberts (2016) 
rather defines populism as  
a natural (though not inevitable) mode of appealing to and incorporating mass political 
constituencies where representative institutions are weak or widely discredited, and where 
various forms of socioeconomic or political exclusion leave many citizens marginalized or 
alienated from such institutions (p. 519).  
From an empirical point of view, therefore, questions whether populist parties fill a 
representative gap concerning excluded citizens, but also the consequences of their electoral 
success on the representation of these citizens’ interests, become relevant. Coined by Pitkin 
(1967), the concept of substantive representation refers to a responsive political decision-
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making process, which should be informed about and reflect a wide range of interests and 
preferences within the electorate. Adopting such a perspective, existing research has 
investigated if the government participation of populist parties translates into the substantive 
representation of the poor (Ruth & Hawkins, 2017). Rethinking the functioning of 
representation, however, scholars have called for more nuanced analyses by taking into account 
a broadened picture and referring to ‘anticipatory representation’ (Celis, Childs, Kantola, & 
Krook, 2008) as a core feature of substantive representation. Instead of merely transferring 
interests, the representatives actively frame the (under-)represented and their preferences 
through ‘claim-making’ (Saward, 2006) and influence substantive representation in a more 
dynamic process through agenda setting already before elections (Chaney, 2015).  
Such a focus allows getting to the empirical connection between political representation 
and party strategic behaviour concerning political exclusion. The literature on party competition 
shows that parties strategically draw attention to certain issues in order appeal to and mobilise 
determined voter groups (Budge & Farlie, 1983). As they aim to mobilise the excluded, populist 
strategies represent a quite specific type of political appeal. According to Resnick (2012) they 
can include an eclectic mix of leftist and neoliberal elements, but are distinguished by their 
focus on social inclusion ‘offering policy packages oriented around providing goods, services, 
and recognition to those who have been excluded from the economic and political status quo’ 
(p. 8). While economic conditions as such may not be conducive to populism, severe 
inequalities and exclusion from traditional institutions of representation provide raw ingredients 
for the effectiveness of such strategies. Indeed it have not only been left-wing populist parties 
but also right-wing or ‘neoliberal’ ones, which in times of economic crises, weak organized 
labour and parties attracted support of the poorest sectors through targeted antipoverty measures 
(Roberts, 1995).  
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Targeted programs have a smaller fiscal impact than universal ones, but their political logic 
is functionally equivalent, as material rewards are exchanged for political support (Roberts, 
1995). What differs are the recipients. While targeted policies such as poverty relief schemes 
directly address low-income groups, universal welfare (e.g. public health or education) 
concerns all citizens.1 Being group specific, targeted policies are especially well suited for 
manipulation by vote-seeking parties (Jusko, 2008). By setting them high on their political 
program, parties not only claim their own representative capacity among the addressed group, 
but also influence the broader ‘party system agenda’ (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 2010) 
forcing competitors to address issues they would rather avoid. While opposition parties may 
promise benefits in order to blame incumbents for poor economic conditions, legislators may 
use them when the support of the poor is essential to maintain office. The decision to campaign 
through such appeals however depends on the broader economic and political context.  
Poverty Responsiveness: Structural and Political Factors 
The (uneven) responsiveness of political parties to different income groups has been explained 
through its relation with (unequal) political participation. Enough evidence illustrates that 
political abstention is concentrated in the poorest sectors of society and that it is induced by 
policies oriented towards the ‘middle classes’ (Elsässer et al., 2017; Solt, 2008). Poorer citizens 
view inequality as favouring the preferences of the better-off and thus are less likely to 
participate because they conclude that politics is ‘simply not a game worth playing’ (Solt, 2008, 
p. 58). Consequently, it has been argued that the demands of poor citizens do not enter the 
decision-making process, as parties in first instance have no incentives to represent those 
demands. Yet, as the decision to vote and the representation of interests are interrelated, the 
 
1 While there is a lot of scientific debate about who actually profits, it has been argued that universal 
welfare regimes benefit the ‘middle class’ more than any other group (Fernandez-Albertos and Manzano 




electoral participation of poor citizens hinges also upon parties’ mobilisation efforts. Beginning 
such efforts, in turn, depends on the expected gains in terms of votes (Anderson & Beramendi, 
2012).  
Given that they constitute their most ‘natural’ voter base, scholarly research on cross-
national differences in the mobilisation of poor voters has focused the analysis on left-wing 
parties stressing the interplay of structural and political factors influencing political 
mobilisation (Anderson & Beramendi, 2012; Pontusson & Rueda, 2010). Concerning structural 
factors, it has been argued that higher levels of income inequality reduce the incentives for 
dominant left-wing parties to target poor voters as it increases the probability that poor citizens 
will ignore those efforts making it harder to clear the cost-benefit threshold for parties 
(Anderson & Beramendi, 2012; Rigby & Wright 2013). The main political factor shaping party 
behaviour towards the poor is party competition. Anderson and Beramendi (2012) show that 
the presence of a challenger on the left creates incentives for dominant left-wing parties to 
mobilise poor voters. When competing for low-income voter support within their own political 
spectrum parties adjust their platforms to challengers and even counteract the negative influence 
of income inequality on the mobilisation of the poor.  
The most straightforward reason for such a behaviour is an expected electoral threat and 
an endangered potential to gain office (Meguid, 2008). By strategically accommodating their 
political agendas to those of competitors, dominant parties try to signal to the public that they 
are (now) seriously committed about an issue they had ignored in the past. This is supposed to 
work due to dominant parties’ higher chances of government participation and policy 
implementation. According to Meguid (2008), mainstream parties’ responses to the rise of 
challengers have important effects on their electoral success. While anticipatory increases in 
low-income voter mobilisation indeed limit the output for challengers, following Anderson and 
Beramendi (2012), they do so even more in the presence of high levels of inequality. Greater 
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inequality increases the mobilisation costs for all parties contributing to reinforce the pre-
emptive effects of an accommodative strategy. Thus, in combination with increased party 
competition on the left, electoral turnout among the poor is likely to increase in more unequal 
countries. 
Emphasising the interplay between structural and political factors in determining party 
strategic behaviour towards the poor, the following analysis tries to acknowledge it in the 
context of the Great Recession. While reinforcing the above-mentioned dynamics due to poorer 
economic conditions, such a context has changed the configuration of actors. In contrast to 
normal times, where the mobilisation of the low-income vote is likely to take place between 
parties on the left, I expect competition for the appeal towards the poor to unfold between 
establishment and new populist parties across the entire political spectrum. A major economic 
crisis like the Great Recession constitutes a ‘critical juncture’ threatening the political 
establishment as a whole and accelerating pre-existing processes of party system change 
(Hernandez & Kriesi, 2016). Indeed, in all severely crisis-affected economies that have been, 
or are still, subject to interventions by the Troika, the electoral decline of mainstream parties 
has not favoured traditional challengers but new anti-establishment parties from left and right 
(Marcos-Marne, Plaza-Colodro, & Freyburg, 2019).  
Introduction to the Case 
Before presenting the hypotheses based on these lines of reasoning, I first provide some 
background information about the case study of this paper. Spain during the economic crisis 
seems to offer a setting particularly well suited for an exploration of the impact that the rise of 
populist parties had on the representation of the poor as it corresponds to the context described 
above by Roberts (2016), i.e. highly discredited institutions, partisan convergence and a great 
amount of economic and political exclusion. The reasons for a regional perspective are at least 
threefold. First, Spanish ACs differ in relation to the number of poor citizens, which allows the 
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impact of structural factors to be explored. Second, public services in Spain have been devolved 
to ACs. Third, new populist challenger parties form the left and right first entered the political 
arena at the regional level. 
With more than 12 million people living in poverty and risk of exclusion, over a quarter of 
the population, Spain is the Western European country with the highest poverty rate (EAPN 
2018). Since the unfolding of the Great Recession, the number of people living in poverty or at 
risk of exclusion has increased by around one million. While the economically and politically 
excluded in fact may not be so new it is certainly true that the crisis has punished the most 
disadvantaged more intensely by worsening their poverty (Gómez & Trujillo 2011). Unlike the 
national level, the values at the regional level indicate high cross-regional variation, showing a 
clear North-South divide. Whereas in the Southern ACs the mean poverty rate is about 28% in 
the Northern ACs, it is below 15%. Analysing the relation between political and economic 
exclusion in Spain, Gómez and Trujillo (2011) confirm that the constituencies with the highest 
abstention rates (of up to 75%) are also the ones showing the highest levels of poverty. Indeed, 
the lack of resources among the most disadvantaged groups of Spanish society is the most 
important factor in generating political exclusion.  
Another reason for adopting a regional focus is the devolution of public services to ACs. 
Decentralisation makes regional governments responsible for providing citizens with services 
that are directly related to their daily needs. Consequently, in decentralised states issues 
concerning welfare are of high relevance at the subnational level (Vampa, 2016).2 Yet, 
concerning the political conflict over welfare Spain has been characterised as an outlier case, 
given that the two dominant parties, the conservative Popular Party (PP) and the Social 
Democratic Workers Party (PSOE), have been very similar over the issue. While this may be 
 
2 A comparison of party manifesto data from the MARPOR and the RMP (see below) in the period under 
analysis (2007-2017) shows that the salience of welfare issues in regional party manifestos (19.23; SD 
6.51) is significantly (p<0.01) higher than in national party manifestos (15.54; SD 4.96). 
11 
 
partly linked to regionalisation, Fernandez-Albertos and Manzano (2012) argue that in Spain 
welfare issues to some degree crosscut the ideological conflict. Distinguishing between 
universal and targeted schemes, they show that welfare expansion along with non-redistributive 
policies or vice versa, are widespread political preferences among the electorate. As welfare 
expansion is compatible with non-redistributive policies, both parties converged to similar pro-
welfare positions.3  
Finally, and most importantly, the main political consequence of the Great Recession in 
Spain has been the growth of two new parties promoting an intense anti-establishment agenda: 
Podemos and Ciudadanos. While electoral support for the two dominant establishment parties, 
PP and PSOE, often exceeded two-thirds of the vote at the national level, in many ACs their 
regional branches share the political space with the regionalist party family whose positions 
along the territorial dimension spread from autonomism to separatist nationalism (Alonso, 
2012). Challengers in the past, they are now in turn being challenged by these new populist 
parties, which emerged after the economic crisis (Scantamburlo et al., 2018). Podemos and 
Ciudadanos were highly successful in their first regional contests, together achieving around 
20% of the regional vote and entering almost all regional parliaments at the 2015 and 2016 
regional elections.4 
Both new parties campaign against old elites and claim to regenerate democracy, but 
substantially differ with regard to the main political cleavages that have been structuring 
Spanish politics, the left-right and centre-periphery conflicts. Ciudadanos can be considered as 
an anti-peripheral and nationalist centre-right party displaying a neoliberal type of populism 
(Sola & Rendueles, 2018). Although it heavily campaigns against minority rights and 
 
3 This is related to more comprehensive studies, which show that welfare issues do not serve to 
differentiate between the left and right as it is frequently mentioned across the ideological spectrum 
(Benoit and Däubler 2014). 
4 While Podemos entered all regional parliaments, Ciudadanos failed to enter in Castile-La Mancha, the 
Canary Islands and Navarre in 2015 and in the Basque Country and Galicia in 2016. 
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regionalist elites, it has not developed typical radical right discourses. Podemos, in turn, is 
apparently more pro-periphery and despite adopting a neither left nor right strategy, it is usually 
defined as left-wing populist party (Marcos-Marne et al., 2019). 
Hypotheses 
Adapting the arguments of the theoretical sections to the changing electoral supply during the 
Great Recession at the regional level in Spain, the present paper has two main aims: First, it 
explores whether the emergence of new populist challenger parties has increased party 
competition concerning poverty responsiveness. Second, it analyses competition between 
establishment and populist challenger parties. My first hypothesis is that in response to the 
electoral growth of new populist parties in the aftermath of the Great Recession, party 
competition in Spanish regions will revolve more strongly around the appeal to low-income 
voters. To be precise, given the higher levels of poverty and the strategic incentives of increased 
populist competition, I expect establishment parties, regionalist and state-wide alike, to react to 
competitors by being more responsive to the poor in their political agendas:  
H1: The electoral growth of new populist challenger parties during the Great Recession will 
lead to increased attention towards poor voters in regional spaces of political competition. 
Since party competition is highly determined by the broader context in which parties act, 
when it comes to poverty responsiveness it is likely that the political effects of the crisis in 
Spain (i.e. the rise of challengers) will be moderated by the structural ones (i.e. the amount of 
poverty). The literature has shown that the interplay of inequality and party competition 
influences political parties’ incentives to mobilise low-income voters (Anderson & Beramendi, 
2012). While higher levels of inequality are likely to reduce these incentives in the absence of 
competitors, they increase them when competitors are present. Applied to the representation of 
the poor at regional level in Spain where the structural effects of the crisis enhanced the cross-
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regional variation in the degrees of poverty and the political effects led to similar competitive 
situations for establishment parties, I expect the following dynamics:  
H2a: The higher the regional poverty rate, the more likely are establishment parties to decrease 
their attention towards poor voters in the absence of new populist challenger parties. 
H2b: The higher the regional poverty rate, the more likely are establishment parties to increase 
their attention towards poor voters in the presence of new populist challenger parties. 
Finally, I also expect variations across types of parties. First, I assume new populist parties 
driving competition by targeting the poor to a greater extent due to a competitive advantage. 
Convincing low-income citizens that they will improve their situation will be difficult for 
establishment parties, who have been identified as the main responsible for the crisis. At the 
same time, as populism cuts across the conventional political alignments so as social policy 
issues do particularly in the Spanish context, I expect the appeal to the poor to depend much 
less on parties’ ideological positioning than on the new populist-establishment divide. Although 
the literature links the politics of inequality with the traditional left-right cleavage, 
representative claims towards the poor are mainly group specific appeals concerning 
redistribution, which can go along with neoliberal adjustments and welfare retrenchment.  
H3: Concerning the appeal to poor citizens, there will be a greater difference between 
establishment and new populist parties than between parties of the left and the right.  
Data and Method 
This article uses data from the content analysis of parties’ electoral manifestos to measure the 
substantive representation of the poor in regional elections. A great deal of literature has 
stressed the advantages of using election manifestos as the main source to analyse political 
parties’ preferences (Alonso et al., 2013). Even if no voter considers them, they are a good 
proxy of electoral campaigns’ and thus an indicator of the degree to which parties are concerned 
to place before the electorate policies that reflect the needs of poor people (Chaney, 2015).  
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In order to measure the substantive representation of the poor at the sub-national level, I 
rely on the data of the Regional Manifestos Project (RMP) combined with the usage of sub-
categories (Horn et al., 2017). The RMP is an adaptation of the Manifesto Project’s (MARPOR) 
methodology, developed for the analysis of multilevel contexts (Alonso et al., 2013). The RMP 
codes quasi-sentences (defined as argument) of regional party manifestos grouping them into a 
set of policy categories to determine how important an issue is for a party. For this analysis the 
most relevant categories are c503 (equality: positive) and c504 (welfare state expansion), as 
almost all references towards the poor are coded under those two items. Yet, as they comprise 
various connotations of equality and welfare and the recipients belong to different societal 
groups, an analysis using those categories would be misleading. I therefore refine the two items 
through sub-categories identifying references that directly address the poor as a social group 
using a similar procedure as in Horn et al. (2017). More concretely, each quasi-sentence 
belonging to these categories has been filtered and sub-coded in order to capture explicit 
references addressing the poor and policies aiming at improving their situation. Table A1 in the 
appendix displays examples of the sub-coding procedure.  
The main empirical indicators throughout the article are salience scores calculated as the 
percentage of quasi-sentences in a manifesto assigned to the relevant sub-categories. While the 
theoretical range of poverty issue salience goes from 0 to 100, empirically it goes from 0 to 
5.82 (Podemos Canary Islands in 2015). This means that the highest attention that any party 
has ever devoted to the poor between 2007 and 2017 is almost 6% percent of a manifesto’s 
quasi-sentences. With 2.17 (SD 1.26), the mean saliency is much lower. Altogether, 163 
electoral manifestos of the most relevant political parties in all 17 Spanish ACs have been sub-
coded. The data include 10 regionalist and 4 state-wide parties, 2 of them being new populist 
challenger parties. Given the relatively smaller size of regionalist parties, I selected parties that 
15 
 
have always been elected to the regional assembly in the period under study with at least 5% 
vote share. Table A2 in the appendix shows the full list of parties and regions in the dataset. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Figure 1 takes a closer look at the representation of the poor in Spanish state-wide and 
regionalist parties’ manifestos (N = 163). In examining this figure, two patterns are readily 
apparent. First, new populist challengers are clearly those parties claiming to represent the poor 
to a higher degree. With a mean of 4.2, the party having the strongest focus on the poor is 
Podemos followed by Ciudadanos who talks about the poor in 3.2% of its manifestos. The 
establishment parties have more similar attention rates, with the PSOE and the regionalist 
parties being more attentive towards the poor than the PP. Second, there is an important 
variance within parties. While the PSOE is the party with the greatest distribution, Ciudadanos 
displays more similar attention rates. Besides the differences between parties, these patterns 
suggest high adjustment to the regional political contexts. 
As I am, first of all, interested in how establishment parties at the regional level respond to 
populist challengers I look at issue emphasis for all establishment parties in 17 Spanish ACs in 
the elections since the unfolding of the Great Recession. My unit of analysis is the individual 
party and to focus on establishment parties’ responses I omit new populist parties from the 
analysis. There are two main explanatory variables. The first one is a dichotomous variable that 
indicates the presence (1) or absence (0) of a populist challenger party that emerged in the 
aftermath of the economic crisis. The second main explanatory variable constitutes the regional 
poverty rate, which aims at capturing if poverty responsiveness varies with the degree of 
poverty. This variable refers to the ratio of the number of people whose income falls below the 
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poverty line and is calculated taking 60% of the median annual income per consumption unit.5 
Acknowledging the no doubt controversial nature of a relative definition of poverty, as it 
depends on the degree of development of the society under study, such a measure can be a 
useful tool for the analysis of a single case in a specific period of time.  
With an eye to previous research, I take into account some additional controls. I first 
include the regional population density, which is calculated according to the population by km2. 
This variable aims at tackling the rural-urban divide, given that the location of poverty may 
differentially influence parties’ responsiveness (Jusko, 2008). Second, I control for a party’s 
government status indicating whether the party was part of the regional government at the time 
of writing the manifesto. Contrary to opposition parties, government parties are likely to be 
more often forced to respond to the ‘party-system agenda’ (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 
2010). As a third control, the vote share in the last regional election accounts for the influence 
of party size. To increase their vote share, smaller parties are more likely to increase their 
emphasis on poverty. Fourth, I include party positioning on the left-right scale using the RILE 
variable developed by the RMP team (Alonso et al., 2013). As the poor constitute their ‘natural 
constituency’ (Anderson & Beramendi, 2012), I expect higher attention among left parties. 
Finally, a dummy identifying the historical nationalities (Catalonia, the Basque Country and 
Galicia) accounts for the different regional electoral calendars and political dynamics (Leonisio 
& Scantamburlo, 2019).  
To evaluate H3, a second set of models presented in the analysis are estimated using a 
different subsample comparing only those elections where populist parties entered competition 
(N = 74) and including dichotomous variables differentiating between populist vs. 
establishment and between left vs. right party groups as additional explanatory variables. While 
the classification of challenger and establishment parties is straightforward, left and right parties 
 
5 I rely on data from the Spanish national statistical institute (INE). 
17 
 
need to be identified. For that purpose, I use a similar approach as Hobolt and de Vries (2015) 
comparing the average RILE scores for each party with the party system mean using weighted 
party values (by vote share). Since negative values refer to leftist positions, parties with mean 
values below the party system mean are coded as left. 
For each set of hypotheses, different models are estimated with ordinary least squares. In 
order to avoid serial correlation, the models include a lagged dependent variable. The lagged 
dependent variable also has a substantial meaning given that parties’ manifestos are not written 
from scratch. The use of panel corrected standard errors (Beck & Katz, 1995) instead is 
inappropriate because the number of parties exceeds the number of time units. Nonetheless, all 
models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by party within region.  
Analysis and Results 
In the previous section, I briefly introduced the programmatic agenda of the main parties acting 
in Spanish ACs and showing the differences concerning the representation of the poor. In this 
section, I am first going to analyse the responses of establishment parties to new competitors in 
the respective regions. I then move on to a more detailed analysis of different party groups. 
Representing the Poor: Responding to Challengers  
According to H1, I should see an increase in the representation of the poor in regional political 
spaces with the emergence of new challengers. An initial visualisation in Figure 2 and Table 
A4 in the appendix shows the evolution of representative claims towards the poor in regional 
political spaces for two electoral periods marked by the beginning of the crisis. The salience 
scores represent average values for all parties in the region, excluding new challenger parties. 
Out of 15 regions, 8 (47%) saw an u-shaped evolution, with an initial decrease in salience at 
the first crisis election, followed by a substantive increase in the second post-crisis electoral 
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cycle. In the remaining 9 regions a constant increase since 2008 can be observed. Only three 
regions (18%) saw issue attention towards the poor increase more at the first post-crisis election.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
The salience analysis over time seem to provide evidence for H1. While in almost the half of 
ACs salience scores even decreased at the first post-crisis election, when challenged by a new 
populist competitor they increase in all regions. Indeed the mean differences between periods 
are statistically significant only between the first and the second post-crisis elections (p < 0.01). 
Looking at issue consistency, which is measured as the coefficient of variation6 of the issue’s 
salience scores in party manifestos (Alonso, 2012), a first decrease followed by an increase can 
be observed between electoral periods (pre-crisis: 0.35; 1st_post: 0.49; 2nd_post: 0.25). This 
again shows that major changes occurred with the emergence of challengers.  
In order to delve further into these findings Table 1 presents the results of two OLS 
regression models. Model 1 is a basic model, with the main independent variables and controls. 
Model 2 includes the interaction of interest. Overall, in terms of explaining the extent to which 
establishment parties respond to the populist challenge, there is again strong support for H1: 
establishment parties’ attention towards the poor significantly increases with the presence of 
new populist challenger parties. Concerning the main structural variable of interest, the poverty 
rate in a region does not play a decisive role for the representation of the poor in regional party 
manifestos. On the other hand, establishment parties seem to increase their attention in regions 
with a higher population density, showing that the representative claims towards the poor are 
stronger in more urban regions than in rural ones. In terms of the other control variables, the 
 
6 The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation divided by the mean and allows knowing if a 
sample is dispersed or concentrated. If the variation ratio is > 0.30, the data is considered to be dispersed. 
If it is < 0.30, the data is concentrated around the mean. 
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estimates indicate that left-wing parties display higher salience scores than right-wing parties, 
as indicated by the negative coefficient of the RILE variable. While the lagged dependent 
variable is strongly significant, which shows that parties base their manifestos on previous ones, 
the remaining variables do not reach standard levels of statistical significance.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
What about the interplay between structural and political factors? Following the theoretical 
lines of reasoning Model 2 includes an interaction between those regional elections, which saw 
a new populist challenger parties emerge and the regional poverty rate. The interaction term is 
statistically significant and positive. Additionally, according to the estimated coefficients 
presented in Model 2, the significant positive effect of the interaction term compensates the 
negative effect of the variable that identifies the regional poverty rate. These effects of the 
poverty rate on party issue attention towards the poor can be interpreted as its independent 
influence when the interaction term is zero – that is, when there is no populist challenger party 
in the region. Consequently higher levels of poverty lead to lower attention towards the poor in 
the absence of challengers, while the opposite seems to be the case in the presence of a 
challenger party. To help interpret correctly the coefficients of the interaction terms Figure 3 
shows the corresponding average marginal effects (AMEs). Concerning the regional poverty 
rate, the effect for the absence of populist challengers is as expected negative, whereas in the 
presence of challengers it is positive. The significance level for the latter are however not as 
strong as for the former. All in all these dynamics provide evidence for the conditional 
hypotheses H2a and H2b.7 
 
7 The results are robust to the inclusion of party dummies, the usage of a different poverty measure (the 




[Figure 3 about here] 
 
To underline the substantive differences between the absence and presence of challenger 
parties, Figure 4 presents the linear predictions on establishment parties’ poverty 
responsiveness depending on the regional poverty rate. The predictions are plotted for various 
levels of poverty and are statistically significant. If the regional poverty rate is low, we see only 
slight differences between establishment parties facing or not facing populist challengers. As 
indicated by the results in Table 1 and Figure 3 this difference significantly increases to almost 
1.9 scale points when the poverty rate is over 35% (Andalusia and the Canary Islands in 2015). 
These values can be compared to the empirical range of the dependent variable, which is about 
5.2. According to the expectations of the literature, higher levels of poverty induce 
establishment parties to ignore the poor in their political offering. The picture however is 
completely different when new challenger parties are present in the political space. Combined 
with increasing populist competition higher levels of poverty create incentives for political 
parties to be more attentive to the poor.  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
Representing the Poor: Establishment Parties vs. New Populist Challengers 
According to H3, populist challenger parties should represent poor citizens in their 
programmatic agenda to a greater degree than establishment parties and this new divide should 
explain the attention towards poor citizens better than traditional left-right positioning. The idea 
behind that is that populism as an answer to ineffectual representation cuts across the 
ideological left-right conflict. While Figure 1 has already shown the difference between 
establishment and populist parties, Table 1 has shown that left-wing establishment parties pay 
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more attention to poor citizens than right-wing ones. In order to compare both political divides, 
Table 2 includes a different subsample with only those regional elections where establishment 
and populist challengers compete with each other. Using dichotomous variables for the various 
party groups Model 1 looks at the differences between left and right parties and Model 2 
between establishment parties and new challengers. Estimating two different models allows 
comparing both effects and the explained variance.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Model 1 again confirms that in their political offering left-wing parties pay attention to the poor 
to a higher degree then right-wing parties. The Left party variable has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on poverty responsiveness compared to the reference category (i.e. Right 
party). This finding is consistent with long-standing historical patterns of electoral democracies 
where voters with lower incomes constitute the most natural constituency of left parties 
(Anderson & Beramendi, 2012). In Model 2, however, the same pattern can be observed when 
differentiating between populist challengers and establishment parties. A comparison of the two 
models shows that the coefficient for populist parties is substantively larger and almost 
doubling the positive effect of the one concerning left parties. Moreover, although the model 
fit in both regressions is not very good, R-square substantially increases in Model 2.  
With respect to the control variables, one finding should be mentioned. While the significant 
effect of poverty rate disappears in Model 2, population density is positively associated to 
poverty responsiveness also for this subsample. Indeed, urban and rural poverty differ 
according to the informal safety nets that both situations may encounter, making poor economic 
circumstances particularly difficult to handle in urban areas (Resnick, 2012). While higher issue 
attention in urban areas may be explained on the basis of a similar dynamic concerning the 
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degrees of poverty, the link between poverty responsiveness and poverty location (Jusko 2008) 
has yet to be to be fully explored. 
Concluding Remarks 
Looking at the case of Spain during the Great Recession, the main objective of this article was 
to provide an answer to two interrelated questions. First, whether and how the emergence of 
new populist challengers (after 2008) has increased establishment parties’ issue attention 
towards poor citizens, and second, whether the difference between the new populist-
establishment divide explains parties’ issue attention towards the poor better then left-right 
positioning. The relevance of these questions is twofold: on the one hand, it fills a gap in the 
literature on populism and its relation with representation of excluded citizens; on the other, it 
looks at the responses of the political establishment to the challenges brought up by new actors.  
First, we have seen that establishment parties have reacted to competitors by increasing the 
attention dedicated to issues concerning poverty in their political agenda. Although they are 
certainly not the ones dominating the debate, there is no doubt that they have broken into the 
party system agenda more strongly than in previous elections. The analysis shows that in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession establishment parties were especially unresponsive to the 
needs of low-income citizens in those regions where the crisis had the strongest effects. Instead, 
it is mainly in these regions that they increased their attention towards the poor after the 
emergence of new competitors. Second, we have seen that populist parties represent the poor 
to a greater degree in their political agenda then establishment parties and that they do so 
irrespective of their left-right positioning. The significant differences between the left and the 
right, however, suggest that concerning the inclusion of low-income citizens the traditional 
ideological divides continue to be highly relevant.  
Therefore, this paper finds confirmation for the corrective potential of populism 
(Kaltwasser, 2012) and the closing of a representative gap. Given the unique character of the 
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Spanish case, however, the findings can only partly be generalised to other cases of Southern 
Europe, such as Italy or Greece, where the first post-crisis decade saw mainly parties from the 
‘left’ challenge old political elites and the cultural-identitarian divide did not reach the same 
relevance as in North Western Europe. The transformation of the Northern League into a state-
wide nationalist party and even the electoral growth of the party VOX in Spain confirm that 
Southern Europe is not immune to the growth of the populist radical right. Testing the populist 
representation hypothesis for this group of parties taking into account the concept of welfare 




Alonso, S. (2012). Challenging the state: Devolution and the battle for partisan credibility. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Alonso, S., Gómez, B., & Cabeza, L. (2013). Measuring centre–periphery preferences: The 
Regional Manifestos Project. Regional & Federal Studies, 23(2), 189–211. 
Anderson, C. J., & Beramendi, P. (2012). Left parties, poor voters, and electoral participation 
in advanced industrial societies. Comparative Political Studies 45(6): 714–746. 
Bartels, L. (2008). Unequal democracy: The political economy of the new gilded age. New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Beck, N., & Katz, J. N. (1995). What to do (and not to do) with time-series-cross-section data 
in comparative politics. American Political Science Review, 89 (3), 634–647. 
Benoit, K., & Däubler, T. (2014). Putting text in context: How to estimate better left-right 
positions by scaling party manifesto data using item response theory. ‘Mapping policy 
preferences from texts’ conference, Berlin. 
Bornschier, S. (2017). Populist mobilization across time and space: An introduction. Swiss 
Political Science Review, 23(4), 301–312. 
Budge, I., & Farlie, D. J. (1983). Party competition: Selective emphasis or direct confrontation? 
An alternative view with data. In Western European Party Systems, edited by Daalder, H. 
and Mair, P. London: Sage, 267–271. 
Caramani, D. (2017). Will vs. Reason: The populist and technocratic forms of political 
representation and their critique to party government. American Political Science Review, 
111(1), 54–67. 
Celis, K., Childs, S., Kantola, J., & Krook, M.L. (2008). Rethinking women’s substantive 
representation. Representation, 44(2), 99–110. 
Chaney, P. (2015). Manifesto discourse and the substantive representation of ethnic minorities: 
analysis of UK state-wide and meso elections, 1964–2011. Parliamentary Affairs, 68(1), 
154–181. 
Ciudadanos Castilla y León. (2015). Castilla y León pide cambio. Programa elecciones 
autonómicas 2015. 
Dahl, R. (1971). Polyarchy: participation and opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
EAPN. (2018). State of poverty. Follow up on the indicator on poverty and social exclusion 
2008-2017 (8th Report). Retrieved from https://www.eapn.es/estadodepobreza/index.php  
Elsässer, L., Hense, S., & Schäfer, A. (2017). „Dem Deutschen Volke“? Die ungleiche 
Responsivität des Bundestags. Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 27(2), 161–180. 
Fernández-Albertos, J., & Manzano, D. (2012). The lack of partisan conflict over the welfare 
state in Spain. South European Society and Politics, 17 (3), 427–447. 
Gómez, B., & Trujillo, M. (2011). Los excluidos también pueden votar: abstención y exclusión 
social en España. Documento de trabajo 169. Madrid: Fundación Alternativas. 
Green-Pedersen, C., & Mortensen, P. (2010). Who sets the agenda and who responds to it in 
the Danish parliament? A new model of issue competition and agenda-setting. European 
Journal of Political Research, 49(2), 257–281. 
25 
 
Hernández, E., & Kriesi H. (2016). The electoral consequences of the financial and economic 
crisis in Europe’. European Journal of Political Research, 55(2), 203–224. 
Hobolt, S.B., & De Vries, C. (2015). Issue entrepreneurship and multiparty competition. 
Comparative Political Studies, 48(9), 1159–1185. 
Horn, A., Kevins, A., Jensen, C., & Van Kersbergen, K. (2017). Research note: peeping at the 
corpus – What is really going on behind the equality and welfare items of the Manifesto 
Project? Journal of European Social Policy, 27(5), 403–416. 
Huber, R. A., & Ruth, S. P. (2017). Mind the gap! Populism, participation and representation 
in Europe. Swiss Political Science Review, 23(4), 462 – 484. 
Jusko, K. L. (2008). The political representation of the poor (Dissertation University of 
Michigan).  
Kaltwasser, C.R. (2012) The ambivalence of populism: Threat and corrective for democracy. 
Democratization, 19(2), 184–208. 
Kriesi, H. (2014). The populist challenge. West European Politics, 37(2), 361–378. 
Laclau, E. (2005). On populist reason. London: Verso. 
Leonisio, R., & Scantamburlo, M. (2019). La competición política en el País Vasco, 1980-2016. 
El equilibrio entre la dimensión económica y la nacionalista. In En busca del poder 
territorial. Cuatro décadas de elecciones autonómicas en España, edited by Gómez, B., 
Alonso, S. and Cabeza, L. Madrid: CiS, 255-279. 
Meguid, B. (2008). Party Competition between unequals. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Marcos-Marne, H., Plaza-Colodro, C., & Freyburg T. (2019). Who votes for new parties? 
Economic voting, political ideology and populist attitudes, West European Politics (early 
view). 
Mair, Peter (2013). Ruling the void: The hollowing of western democracy. London: Verso. 
Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563. 
Mudde, C., Kaltwasser, C. R. (2013). Exclusionary vs. inclusionary populism: comparing 
contemporary Europe and Latin America. Government and Opposition, 48 (2), 147–174. 
Pitkin, H. F. (1967). The concept of representation. Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press. 
Podemos Castilla y León. (2015). Medidas para el cambio en Castilla y León. Programa 
elecciones autonómicas 2015. 
Pontusson, J., & Rueda, D. (2010). The politics of inequality: voter mobilization and left parties 
in advanced industrial states. Comparative Political Studies, 43(6), 675–705. 
Resnick, D. (2012). Opposition parties and the urban poor in African democracies. 
Comparative Political Studies, 45(11), 1351–1378. 
Rigby, E., & Wright, G. D. (2013). Political parties and representation of the poor in the 
American states. American Journal of Political Science, 57(3), 552–565. 
Roberts, K. M. (1995). Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism in Latin America: the 
Peruvian case. World Politics 48(1), 82-116. 
26 
 
Roberts, K. M. (2016). Populism and political representation, in The Oxford handbook of the 
politics of development edited by Lancaster C. and van de Walle, N. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 517–536. 
Ruth, S. P., & Hawkins, K. (2017). Populism and democratic representation in Latin America, 
In Handbook on political populism, edited by Heinisch, R., Mazzoleni, O. and Holtz-
Bacha, C. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 255–273. 
Saward, M. (2006). The representative claim. Contemporary Political Theory, 5(3), 297–318. 
Scantamburlo, M., Alonso, A., & Gómez, B. (2018). Democratic regeneration in European 
peripheral regions: New politics for the territory? West European Politics, 41(2), 615-639. 
Schäfer, A. (2018). The poor representation of the poor. In Destabilizing orders – 
Understanding the consequences of neoliberalism, edited by Andersson, J. and Godechot, 
O. Paris: MaxPo Discussion Paper 18/1, 86–89. 
Sola, J., & Rendueles, C. (2018) Podemos, the upheaval of Spanish politics and the challenge 
of populism. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 26(1), 99–116. 
Solt, F. (2008). Economic inequality and democratic political engagement. American Journal 
of Political Science, 52(1), 48–60. 
Vampa, D. (2016). The Regional politics of welfare in Italy, Spain and Great Britain. 






Table 1. The impact of challenger parties on the representation of the poor 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Challenger 0.978*** (0.184) 0.006 (0.389) 
Poverty rate 0.0002 (0.008) -0.029** (0.012) 
Poverty rate x Challenger   0.051*** (0.017)  
Population density 0.001*** (0.0003) 0.001*** (0.0003)  
Incumbency 0.038 (0.188) 0.010 (0.185) 
Party size -0.006 (0.006) -0.006 (0.006) 
Rile position -0.026** (0.010) -0.026** (0.010) 
Historical nationality -0.126 (0.203) -0.160 (0.196) 
Party issue attention (t-1) 0.444***  (0.127) 0.491*** (0.119) 
Constant 0.950*** (0.317) 1.479*** (0.335)  
N 88  88  
R2 0.523  0.557  
DV, Poverty issue attention (percentage of quasi-sentences that is devoted to the issue of poverty in 




Table 2. Representation of the poor according to different party groups 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Left party 0.663*** (0.232)   
Populist party   1.163*** (0.239) 
Poverty rate 0.023* (0.012) 0.017 (0.012) 
Population density 0.001*** (0.0004) 0.001** (0.0006) 
Incumbency -0.259 (0.313) -0.365 (0.291) 
Party size -0.017 (0.015) 0.013 (0.014) 
Historical nationality -0.140 (0.228) 0.147 (0.192) 
Constant 2.519*** (0.411) 1.875*** (0.400) 
N 74  74  
R2 0.270  0.359  
DV, Poverty issue attention (percentage of quasi-sentences that is devoted to the issue of poverty in 






Figure 1. Poverty issue attention of different parties 
 
Note: The boxplots represent the percentage of manifesto space that is devoted to the issue of poverty 




Figure 2. Change in poverty issue attention by region (pre- and post-crisis) 
 
Note: The bars represent the percentage of manifesto space that is devoted to the issue of poverty 




Figure 3. Marginal effects plot 
 
Note: The value for the absence of challengers is -0.029 (p = 0.016) and the presence of challengers 




Figure 4. Linear prediction of poverty issue attention 
 
Note: The dotted line indicates the presence (1) and the solid line the absence (0) of challengers. Error 






Table A1. Examples of the sub-coding of RMP equality and welfare codes 
RMP Code Description 
c503 Equality positive 
 Concept of social justice and the need for fair treatment of all people. This may include 
the following: Special protection for underprivileged social groups; Removal of class 
barriers; Need for fair distribution of resources; The end of discrimination. 
Subcode: Example sentence: 
c503_0 Ciudadanos reaffirm their defence of the welfare state as a guarantee of equal 
opportunities (Ciudadanos Castilla y León 2015). 
c503_1 We will deploy social prevention policy actions aimed at the most vulnerable 
segments of the population and will focus on the most common causes of social 
exclusion (Ciudadanos Castilla y León 2015). 
c504 Welfare state expansion 
 Favourable mentions of need to introduce maintain or expand any public social service 
or social security scheme. This includes, for example, government funding of the 
following: Healthcare; Childcare; Elder care and pensions; Social housing. 
Subcode: Example sentence: 
c504_0 Restoration of public character in the management of social services and 
subordination of these services under the control of citizens (Podemos Castilla y 
León 2015). 
c504_1 Public information on the current plans on aid for social rents, mortgage payments 
and social benefits for families with limited resources and at risk of marginalisation 
and social exclusion (Podemos Castilla y León 2015). 
Note: All the quasi-sentences belonging to equality and welfare expansion that include explicit 
references to poverty or socio-economic exclusion have been sub-coded as c50X_1, while all the other 
quasi-sentences of the equality and welfare categories not including such references have been sub-




Table A2. Mean poverty issue attention by party and region (new populist parties in bold) 
By Party 
Party N 
Poverty Issue Salience 
Mean SD Min Max 
Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) 51 2.03 1.14 0 5.20 
Popular Party (PP) 51 1.44 0.88 0 3.70 
Podemos  17 4.20 0.91 2.43 5.82 
Ciudadanos (C’s) 13 3.18 0.67 1.60 4.17 
Aragonese Party (PAR) 3 1.12 0.35 0.87 1.52 
Socialist Party of Majorca (PSM/Més)  3 1.47 0.35 1.23 1.88 
Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ) 3 2.35 0.32 1.99 2.61 
Basque Country Unite (EHB) 4 2.63 1.02 1.62 3.57 
Regionalist Party of Cantabria (PRC)  3 3.12 1.30 1.7 4.24 
Canarian Coalition (CC) 3 1.83 0.68 1.41 2.61 
Navarre Yes (NaBai/GeBai)  3 1.99 0.79 1.38 2.88 
Convergence and Union (CiU/JxC) 3 1.68 0.52 1.12 2.14 
Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) 3 2.73 0.94 2.14 3.81 




Poverty Issue Salience 
Mean SD Min Max 
Andalusia 8 2.46 1.23 1.02 4.74 
Aragon 11 1.64 1.41 0.39 4.72 
Asturias 8 1.98 1.34 0.18 3.63 
Cantabria 11 2.07 1.22 0.23 4.24 
Castile and Leon 8 1.86 1.22 0.74 4.17 
Castile-La Mancha 7 1.88 2.00 0 5.71 
Canary Islands 10 2.33 1.61 0.81 5.82 
Catalonia 15 2.60 1.35 0.62 5.20 
Extremadura 8 1.66 0.93 0.91 3.28 
Galicia 10 1.91 0.85 1.03 3.85 
Balearic Islands 11 2.30 1.06 0.92 4.04 
Murcia 8 2.70 1.24 1.18 4.56 
Madrid 8 2.87 1.23 1.20 4.51 
Navarre 12 2.15 1.27 0.70 4.80 
Basque Country 12 2.17 0.98 0.87 4.04 
La Rioja 8 2.16 1.22 0.85 4.50 






Table A3. Descriptive statistics 
Ad Table 1 (Model 1 and 2) 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Poverty issue salience 133 1.816 1.026 0 5.2 
Challenger Party 133 0.338 0.475 0 1 
Poverty rate 133 18.669 7.904 5.9 35.4 
Population density 133 166.443 165.301 26 800 
Government party 133 0.466 0.501 0 1 
Vote share  133 33.406 13.557 7.21 60.09 
RILE position 133 -0.952 7.057 -24.32 18.86 
Historical region 133 0.241 0.429 0 1 
 
Ad Table 2 (Model 1 and 2) 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Poverty issue salience 74 3.096 1.064 1.06 5.82 
Left party 74 0.541 0.502 0 1 
Populist party 74 0.392 0.492 0 1 
Poverty rate 74 19.458 8.471 9 35.4 
Population density 74 167.797 177.524 26 800 
Government party 74 0.258 0.440 0 1 
Vote share  74 19.936 10.450 4.26 48.3 





Table A4. Evolution of poverty issue attention in the space of political competition by region 
(pre- and post-crisis; standard deviations in brackets) 
Region Pre-crisis 1st_post-crisis 2nd_post-crisis 
Andalusia 1.90 (0.47) 1.32 (0.42) 2.47 (0.81) 
Aragon 0.73 (0.21) 0.66 (0.25) 1.77 (0.22) 
Asturias 0.44 (0.37) 1.30 (0.92) 2.65 (0.58) 
Balearic Islands 1.36 (0.52) 2.51 (1.06) 2.67 (0.91) 
Canary Islands 1.08 (0.30) 1.44 (0.39) 3.31 (0.61) 
Cantabria 0.81 (0.78) 2.13 (1.36) 3.05 (1.04) 
Castile-La Mancha 1.26 (0.69) 0.00 (0.00) 2.48 (0.57) 
Castile and Leon 1.09 (0.41) 0.91 (0.24) 1.77 (0.50) 
Catalonia 1.70 (1.03) 2.72 (1.71) 2.79 (1.51) 
Extremadura 1.15 (0.30) 0.93 (0.03) 1.52 (0.65) 
Galicia 1.36 (0.26) 1.38 (0.30) 2.35 (0.14) 
La Rioja 1.33 (0.67) 1.32 (0.41) 2.03 (0.13) 
Madrid 2.30 (0.37) 1.41 (0.29) 4.10 (0.57) 
Murcia 1.46 (0.02) 1.93 (1.07) 3.52 (0.52) 
Navarre 1.02 (0.34) 1.53 (0.44) 2.95 (0.73) 
Basque Country 1.63 (0.85) 1.76 (0.62) 2.52 (0.90) 
Valencia 1.00 (0.32) 0.62 (0.32) 2.73 (0.08) 
 
 
 
